Jamming of NB-IoT synchronisation signals by Morillo, Gabriela & Roedig, Utz
UCC Library and UCC researchers have made this item openly available.
Please let us know how this has helped you. Thanks!
Title Jamming of NB-IoT synchronisation signals
Author(s) Morillo, Gabriela; Roedig, Utz
Publication date 2021-10-04
Original citation Morillo, G. and Roedig, U. (2021) ‘Jamming of NB-IoT synchronisation
signals’, 26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
(ESORICS) 2021, Virtual Event, 04-08 October. Forthcoming
publication




Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights For the purpose of Open Access, the authors have applied a CC BY






Jamming of NB-IoT Synchronisation Signals
Gabriela Morillo and Utz Roedig
University College Cork, Ireland
{g.morillo,u.roedig}@cs.ucc.ie
Abstract. Narrowband-Internet of Things (NB-IoT) is a relatively novel
Low Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN) radio technology used to de-
ploy Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures at scale. It is important
that such deployments are resilient to attacks. In this work we describe
how interference on the NB-IoT synchronisation signals - the initial com-
munication steps - can be used to implement an effective Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attack. Interference with the synchronisation prevents com-
munication and may also allow an attacker to force a device to connect
with a specific base station.
1 Introduction
Narrowband-Internet of Things (NB-IoT) is a Low Power Wide Area Network
(LPWAN) radio technology defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) standard, Release-13 [1]. NB-IoT aims to support a large number of
low-cost, low energy consumption, and low data rate devices operated in a large
enhanced coverage area. NB-IoT is increasingly seen as the preferred future IoT
technology as it is deployed as part of the existing Long-Term Evolution (LTE)
infrastructure and uses a licensed band that enables reliable and future-proof
deployments. NB-IoT provides several security mechanisms based on established
mechanisms defined for LTE [2]. However, privacy and security in NB-IoT have
yet received little research attention.
In this work we consider an adversary using a jamming device to disrupt
NB-IoT communication. We consider an intelligent jammer that targets the ini-
tial communication steps of NB-IoT communication to have a maximum im-
pact. Specifically we describe and investigate how a jammer can interfere with
the Narrowband Primary Synchronisation Signal (NPSS) and Narrowband Sec-
ondary Synchronisation Signal (NSSS) which are used to initiate the NB-IoT
contention-based random-access procedure. NPSS and NSSS perform time and
frequency synchronisation, cell identity detection and acquisition of frame in-
frastructure information. NPSS is used to obtain symbol timing and Carrier
Frequency Offset (CFO), while NSSS is used to obtain the Narrowband Physical
Cell ID (NB-PCID). Interference with NPSS and NSSS can prevent an NB-IoT
device to initiate communication with a base station (eNodeB). Furthermore, our
experiments indicate that careful design of the interference signal could allow an
attacker to force the User Equipment (UE) to recognise a specific NB-PCID.
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Existing work has focused on LTE specific attacks. For example, Eygi et al. [3]
describe a countermeasure against smart jamming attacks on LTE synchronisa-
tion signals. The authors point out the vulnerability of LTE to jamming attacks
due to the broadcast nature of the channel. Their work is focused specifically on
the LTE downlink synchronisation signals. As countermeasure a jamming detec-
tion is proposed based on the Neyman-Pearson theorem. Simulation results show
lower jamming success and better cell id detection. Labib et al. [4] describe a
mechanism to enhance the immunity of LTE Systems against spoofing. The work
analyses spoofing of the LTE synchronisation signal where standard-compliant
primary and secondary synchronisation sequences are transmitted by a fake cell.
Several mitigation techniques are proposed. The simulation results show that
LTE control channel spoofing is an effective DoS attack during the cell selection
process.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not yet been an investigation of
smart jamming attacks on the synchronisation signals in NB-IoT.
2 The UE and eNodeB Synchronisation Process
The full specification of the NB-IoT protocol was completed in June 2016 and
is described in [5]. Here we describe only the synchronisation procedure.
When an NB-IoT device (the UE) becomes active, it synchronises with a
base station (eNodeB) to establish a communication link. First, the UE needs
to identify a suitable cell to attach to and for this purpose parameters such as
symbol, subframe, and frame timing and carrier frequency synchronisation must
be obtained.
The NB-IoT random access procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. The process
starts with the transmission of the NPSS and NSSS which are used by the
UE to perform time and frequency synchronisation, cell identity detection and
acquisition frame infrastructure information. The NPSS is used to obtain symbol
timing and Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO), while the NSSS is used to obtain
the NB-PCID.
After this step, the UE acquires the Master Information Block (MIB) carried
by the Narrowband Broadcast Channel (NPBCH) which is transmitted in sub-
frame 0 in every transmitted frame. The MIB provides scheduling information
for the uplink and downlink data channels.
Then, the random-access procedure initiates when the UE sends a ran-
dom access preamble through Narrowband Physical Random Access Channel
(NPRACH). Several messages are exchanged between UE and eNodeB through
the Narrowband Physical Downlink Shared Channel (NPDSCH) and Narrow-
band Physical Uplink Shared Channel (NPUSCH) to obtain scheduling infor-
mation and identity parameters that allow the connection establishment [6].
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Fig. 1. NB-IoT Random Access Procedure. Initial steps of a UE to establish commu-
nication with an eNodeB.
3 Jamming the NB-IoT Synchronisation Process
The NB-IoT standard defines that NPSS and NSSS are transmitted in specific
subframes on an 80 ms repetition interval. Both signals are designed to allow
a device to use a unified synchronisation algorithm during initial acquisition
without knowing the specific NB-IoT operation mode [6]. Therefore, to avoid
collisions with LTE subframes, subframe 5 is used for the NPSS and subframe
9 is used for the NSSS. Also, in order to avoid a potential collision with the
LTE Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH), the subframes that carry
NPSS or NSSS do not use the first three Orthogonal Frequency Division Multi-
plexing (OFDM) symbols. Thus, it leaves only 11 OFDM symbols per subframe
available for NPSS and NSSS. The NPSS detection by the UE requires that the
signal is detectable even with a very large frequency offset. Hence, all cells in an
NB-IoT network use the same NPSS sequence. Consequently, a device only needs
to search for one specific known NPSS sequence. Each of the 11 OFDM symbols
in an NPSS subframe carries a copy of the base sequence. NB-IoT supports 504
unique NB-PCIDs indicated by the NSSS. Four different NSSS sequences are
transmitted in an 80 ms repetition interval.
The NB-PCIDs is determined by a correlation algorithm using NPSS and
NSSS which defines the peak correlation magnitude PEAK as the sum of the
peak correlation magnitudes from time-domain NPSS detection and frequency-
domain NSSS detection. PEAK is a scalar indicating the peak magnitude of the
correlation used to detect a cell.
Adding a jamming signal to the NPSS and NSSS signal may have the effect
that the correlation algorithm is still able to produce a result but the determined
NB-PCIDs is incorrect. Jamming can be applied only to the NPSS and NSSS
signal without the need to continuously jam the entire transmission channel.
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4 Jamming Evaluation
To test the aforementioned jamming attack on the synchronisation signal, we
use Matlab [7] with the LTE-Toolbox. The simulation fully synchronises, de-
modulates and decodes an NB-IoT downlink signal. A time-domain waveform
of a Reference Measurement Channel (RMC) is generated for an NPDSCH; the
Matlab class used for this purpose is NBIoTDownlinkWaveformGenerator. Then,
we introduce a jamming signal generated using a downlink 4G RMC waveform
where we can adjust the signal power. The resulting signal received by the UE is
the sum of the generated signal obtained from the base station plus the jamming
signal.
Following the example, the frequency offset estimation and correction are
performed through the lteFrequencyOffset and lteFrequencyCorrect methods. Af-
terwards, OFDM demodulation and channel estimation are executed. Finally, to
decode the MIB, the RE corresponding to the NPBCH from the first subframe
across all receive antennas and channel estimates are extracted.
In our simulation, if the power of the interference signal is above 13dB a suc-
cessful modification of the NB-PCIDs is observed. From the experiment results,
it is observed that if the power on the jammer is insufficient, the communication
with the specific eNodeB is inhibited because the UE is not able to decode the
MIB and get the scheduling information.
Figure 2(a) shows the transmission signal without a jamming signal. Here,
the cell ID is accurately detected [NNCellID: 120], and the MIB is decoded
correctly. At this point, the MIB parameters are extracted (NNCellID, NB Ref-
erence Signal, Number of Sufbrame, HyperSuframe, Operation Mode, Additional
Transmission SIB1).
In contrast, scenario Figure 2(b) shows the signal with jammer, where it
is observed that it is not possible to decode the MIB, and a wrong cell ID is
displayed [NNCellID: 371].
Fig. 2. Jamming Attack on NB-IoT: (a) Standard Transmission (b) Transmission with
Jamming Signal.
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5 Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to interfere with the synchronisation signal
used by NB-IoT devices (the UE) to establish communication with the base
station. Thus, a simple selective jamming device can prevent communication of
NB-IoT devices. Furthermore, our experiments indicate that careful design of the
interference signal might enable an attacker to force the UE to recognise a specific
NB-PCID. In our next steps, we will analyse how the jamming signal should be
designed for this purpose. We also plan to investigate methods to detect the
jamming of synchronisation signals and methods to make the detection of the
NB-PCID more robust.
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